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The Role of Transfer Pricing and 
Income Shifting 
Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
The role of the corporate income tax in distorting capital investment and sav- 
ings decisions has been investigated at length in the academic literature. While 
much progress has been made in understanding the behavioral implications of 
the tax, the recent literature has increasingly raised questions regarding why 
such taxes continue to exist. For example, Gordon (1986) and Rain  and Sadka 
(1991) argued that a small open economy should not impose a source-based 
tax such as a corporate income tax on capital income. If capital is mobile and 
the country is a price-taker in the world capital market, capital cannot bear the 
incidence of the tax. Firms would continue to locate in the country only if other 
factor prices (primarily for land and labor) drop by  enough to compensate 
firms for the higher amount they have to generate before tax so as to be able to 
provide capital owners the going rate of  return after tax. But if  these other 
factors bear the tax anyway, it would be better to tax them directly, thereby 
eliminating a distortion that discourages capital investment in the country. 
While the theory forecasts that small open economies should not impose 
source-based taxes on capital income, in fact essentially all developed econo- 
mies do impose corporate income taxes. Not only are corporate tax rates non- 
zero, but in recent years they tend to be roughly comparable with the top per- 
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1. See Auerbach (1983),  e.g., for a recent survey of  the effects of  the tax on corporate  in- 
vestment. 
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sonal tax rate in each country. Are countries systematically using a tax that is 
dominated by other available instruments? Or has something important been 
omitted from the existing theories?2 
The problem with the existing theories cannot be simply that they assume 
economies are small and open. If economies are large, then they certainly have 
an incentive to take advantage of their market power in world capital markets. 
Capital importers would want to reduce their capital imports to drive down the 
interest rate they pay on these imports, and so would want to tax domestic 
investment  and  encourage  domestic  savings.  Conversely,  capital  exporters 
would want to reduce their capital exports by taxing domestic savings and sub- 
sidizing domestic investment. But we do not see opposite patterns of taxation 
in  capital-importing  and  capital-exporting  countries,  nor  do  we  see  sign 
changes when countries change from exporting to importing  capital (as the 
United States did in the 1980s). 
What if countries are not that open? Feldstein and Horioka (1980) provided 
striking empirical evidence suggesting that capital is quite immobile interna- 
tionally. If economies are relatively closed, it might appear that pressures due 
to capital mobility would be much abated, allowing capital income taxes to 
survive. But any conclusions here will depend critically on what factors limit 
capital mobility. Gordon and Bovenberg (1993) explore the policy implications 
of various possible explanations for the observed capital immobility and find 
little prospect for rationalizing existing corporate taxes through this route. 
The puzzles are not confined to government behavior. Firm behavior is also 
puzzling. Existing theories forecast, for example, that multinationals based in 
high-tax-rate countries are at a distinct tax disadvantage when investing in low- 
tax-rate countries. As do all firms located there, they pay corporate income 
taxes to the local government. However, they pay additional taxes to their home 
government when profits are repatriated. This surtax should put the multina- 
tional at a tax disadvantage. Yet U.S. multinationals invest heavily even in the 
lowest-tax-rate countries; see, for example, Hines and Rice (1994). 
Reported rates of return also contradict the theoretical predictions. Domestic 
surtaxes on foreign earnings are postponed until repatriation, so multinationals 
face lower effective tax rates in countries with lower statutory rates. This im- 
plies that the pretax competitive rate of return should be lower in low-tax coun- 
tries. But Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Grubert and Mutti (1987) find that 
pretax profit rates are higher in low-tax countries. 
Observed investment and profit rates in low-tax countries are almost cer- 
tainly explained by the ease with which a multinational can shift its accounting 
profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.  For example, a subsidiary in a 
high-tax  country can charge artificially  low prices for outputs and pay artifi- 
2. A more extended discussion of alternative explanations for corporate taxation, and their limi- 
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cially high prices for inputs that it exchanges with a subsidiary in a low-tax 
country This lowers higher-taxed income and raises lower-taxed income, re- 
ducing the firm’s global tax liabilities. Locating subsidiaries in tax havens facil- 
itates this process, and it is not surprising that these subsidiaries as a result 
report a high pretax rate of return. Evidence confirming the prevalence of in- 
come shifting is provided by  Harris et al. (1993). They find that firms with 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries pay lower U.S. taxes and firms with subsidiar- 
ies in high-tax countries pay  higher U.S. taxes, suggesting income shifting 
from high- to low-tax locations. 
Cross-border income shifting alone cannot explain the puzzling aspects of 
government behavior, however. If we take account of not only the mobility of 
real capital but also the mobility of accounting profits, the pressures to reduce 
corporate tax rates are only increased. The forecast is still that corporate tax 
rates should equal zero. 
Transfer pricing is not, however, the only important type of income shifting 
that is likely to occur. Musgrave (1959), for example, argued that a primary 
role for the corporate income tax is to close off opportunities for individuals 
to shift labor income to an otherwise untaxed corporate tax base. Without a 
corporate tax, for example, ownerlmanagers of closely held firms could incor- 
porate, retain earnings rather than pay them out as wages, then sell some of 
their shares, making their earnings subject to capital gains tax rates rather than 
labor income tax rates. A corporate tax  would offset this tax  incentive and 
reduce the efficiency costs that such income shifting might induce. 
In this paper, we model explicitly the effects of both forms of income shift- 
ing on behavior and on optimal tax policy. In section 3.1, we introduce only 
domestic income shifting (between personal and corporate income) and ex- 
plore its effects on optimal tax design. We find that optimal source-based taxa- 
tion on corporations is positive, with a tax rate equal to the labor income tax 
rate. The optimal tax is a pure profits or cash-flow tax. 
In section 3.2, we add cross-border income shifting (transfer pricing) to the 
model. In response to transfer pricing, countries face incentives to tax elements 
of reported income that are most subject to transfer pricing at a reduced rate, 
or to make them only partially deductible. The optimal corporate tax rate is 
now  somewhat less than the rate on labor, which is consistent with most tax 
systems in developed countries (at least for the top tax rates on labor, which 
presumably apply to those people best able to shift income to the corporate 
sector). 
We  explore a variety of other seemingly puzzling aspects of existing corpo- 
rate tax codes in section 3.3. Why, for example, do many countries allow multi- 
nationals to receive credits rather than deductions for taxes they paid abroad? 
Why are they taxed only when profits are repatriated? Why do host countries 
tax the income of foreign subsidiaries? We  argue that these aspects of the law 
also make sense if the primary pressure affecting the design of the law is the 
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3.1  Tax Policy with Domestic Income Shifting 
We first explore two approaches to modeling tax policy in the face of domes- 
tic income shifting. In the first, the model we will ultimately use for the host 
countries, individuals can shift the form of payment of their labor income from 
cash wages to nonwage forms, taxed in practice at the corporate tax rate. For 
example, a closely held firm in which the shares are owned by the manager 
and employees can retain  what would otherwise have been  wage payments, 
generating capital gains for the shareholder/employees.3 Eliminating wage de- 
ductions generates income  subject to corporate taxes, while  we assume for 
simplicity that the capital gains received by employees on their shares are free 
of personal taxes.4 Such income shifting presumably imposes real costs on the 
firm, however, since these alternative forms of compensation affect employees’ 
liquidity  and risk  bearing and may create complications  due to asymmetric 
information about the value of these shares. 
The second model, which we apply to home countries, assumes that only 
corporate entrepreneurs are in a position to shift their form of pay at a reason- 
able cost. When individuals make a career choice between becoming an entre- 
preneur or an employee, and between incorporating or not, they take into ac- 
count  that  income  earned  as an  employee  (or  noncorporate  entrepreneur) 
would be taxed under the personal income tax, whereas income earned as a 
corporate entrepreneur could in practice be taxed under the corporate tax but 
exempt from personal taxes. The choices to become an entrepreneur and to 
incorporate both involve a variety of nontax considerations, however, that must 
be traded off with any tax factors.5 
In each model, a corporate income tax can be used to reduce the tax incen- 
tives that would otherwise exist to shift one’s form of pay or one’s career path. 
This role for the corporate income tax was mentioned at least as far back as 
Musgrave (1959). To focus on this role for the corporate tax, we will not intro- 
duce capital into the model. Our objective is not to rationalize the existence of 
capital income taxes, but of corporate income taxes. While existing corporate 
taxes do distort capital investment decisions, much of  the revenue seems to be 
collected from the taxation of pure profits, which we interpret to represent the 
return to entrepreneurial ideas and effort6 We are able to introduce a distor- 
3. Alternatively, the firm can pay employees in the form of  stock transfers or qualified stock 
options rather than wages, generating extra taxable income for the firm due to the lost wage deduc- 
tions and normally generating only capital gains income for the employees. 
4. In most countries, personal capital income in at least some forms is taxed more lightly than 
labor income. Examples include a zero tax on capital gains that are passed to heirs at death, a 
lower tax rate on dividends, and favorable treatment of pension savings. 
5. See Gravelle and  Kotlikoff (1989), MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991), and Gordon and 
MacKie-Mason (1994) for more detailed analyses of the decision whether to incorporate. 
6.  Gordon and Slemrod (1988) and Shoven (1991) have calculated that although the US.  corpo- 
rate income tax generates substantial revenues, capital income taxes in the United States in total 
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tionary tax that captures the essential features of a corporate income tax with- 
out modeling capital explicitly. 
3.1.1  Optimal Tax Policy in Home Countries 
Consider first a situation in which corporate entrepreneurs but not other indi- 
viduals can shift their income from the personal to the corporate tax base. In 
particular, assume that the population consists of a composite individual. This 
individual spends some fraction 1 -  h of his work effort as an employee, eam- 
ing a wage w that is taxed at the personal tax rate t. The remaining work effort 
is spent running corporations. Here, the net return per unit of effort before tax 
equals IT; this income is taxable at rate T leaving IT"  = (1 -  T)IT net of tax.' 
Setting up a new corporation requires an outlay of resources, however, and we 
assume that there are diminishing returns to these expenditures. These start-up 
costs are assumed to be deductible against the profits tax. On net, we therefore 
describe the individual's net wage rate, wn,  by 
W"  = (1 -  h)w(l -  t)  + h(1 -  T)Tr -  (1 -  T)C(h), 
where c(h)  measures the cost of setting up a new corporation of sufficient size 
to absorb the fraction h of one's work time. The individual's resulting utility 
can be expressed by the indirect utility function V(w,). 
Individuals decide how much to work, and how to split this time between 
being an employee versus being an entrepreneur. The first-order condition for 
h simply implies that w(  1- t) = (1 -  T)(T  -  c'),  so that the net returns from 
the two career paths are equalized at the margin, after taking into account the 
costs of becoming an entrepreneur. 
Consider the optimal tax policy in this country. The government's objective 
is to choose the tax rates t and T so as to maximize the objective 
w  = v(w,)  i-  AL[(  1 -  h)tw + h7IT -  TC(h)], 
where L represents  total hours of  work and where  A  measures the marginal 
utility received from extra government expenditures. Consider the effect of 
increasing T and cutting t simultaneously so as to leave wpaffected.  To keep 
w,  unaffected, we need that at/& = -[/ZIT -  c(h)]/[(l  -  h)w]. With w,  fixed, 
L also remains unchanged. Since aW/&  =  = 0 under the optimal poli- 
cies, this combined tax change should leave welfare unaffected at the margin. 
The resulting first-order condition for this proposed  tax change, after some 
simplification, equals 
7. In general, 7 includes both corporate and personal taxes due on corporate income. For sim- 
plicity of  discussion, we will refer to 7 as the corporate tax rate, as if no personal taxes are due on 
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Raising corporate taxes (T)  and lowering labor taxes (t)  leads to an unambigu- 
ous decrease in h, lowering the time spent as an entrepreneur and increasing 
time spent as an employee. Therefore, this first-order condition implies that 
aW/ah = 0, implying that T(IT -  c’) = tw under the optimal tax policy-the 
same taxes are paid regardless of career choice, so as not to distort the individ- 
ual’s choice of h. Substituting for IT -  c’ from the individual’s first-order condi- 
tion, we find that 7  = t under the optimal policy. 
In addition, we can show that the government would not want to introduce 
a distorting tax on corporate activity. Consider, for example, some distorting 
tax u on the firm, leaving it with net profits (1 -  T)[T -  S(u,X)],  where X 
represents the real decisions made by the firm which are distorted by u. The 
government’s policy objective would now equal 
w  = v(W,) -k  kL{(  1 -  h)tw f h[TIT + (1 -  T)S] -  TC(h)}. 
In order to show that the optimal value of u is zero, consider the effects of 
raising u  and  simultaneously  lowering  T  so as to leave w,  and  thus  L  un- 
changed. This requires that &/au = -{(I  -  ~)h/[h(~  -  S) -  c]}aS/au. The 
resulting first-order condition for W is8 
By equation (l),  aW/ah = 0 under the optimal tax policy, so that the first term 
in equation (2) is zero. Since the firm’s first-order condition for X  implies that 
a~ldX  = aS/dX, equation (2) implies that aS/aX = 0 under the optimal policy. 
Since, by assumption, u distorts the firm’s choice of X, Wax can equal zero 
only when u = 0. The optimal tax policy therefore consists of a wage tax plus 
a nondistortionary cash-flow corporate tax at equal rates. 
3.1.2  Optimal Tax Policy in Host Countries 
Consider next a slightly different model, in which all employees are in a 
position to shift the tax treatment of their labor income. In particular, assume 
that there is only one source of employment, working to produce some good 
X. This good is produced using a constant returns technology subject to free 
entry, so that there are no pure profits  in equilibrium.  Normally, we would 
assume that all earnings are paid out as wages, taxed at the personal rate t*. 
Now add the complication that if the tax rate on a firm’s income, denoted by 
T*, is lower than that on labor income, then the firm can pay individuals in a 
form that is taxed  at the firm’s rate rather than  at the individual’s rate. This 
income shifting is not costless, however. If the individual receives the fraction 
has the option to pay all income out as wages, the maximum effective tax rate on corporate income 
is t. 
8. Since a pure profits tax rate is nondistorting, changing T cannot change the firm’s choice of X. 73  Why Is There Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? 
s of her labor income w* in a form taxable at the firm's tax rate, we assume 
that the labor costs to the firm equal w*[l + b(s)].  Here, b(s)  represents the 
real costs of shifting the tax treatment of labor income, where by assumption 
b(s)  is convex, b'  > 0, and b(0) = 0. In equilibrium, firms continue to break 
even, so thatp = w*(l + b). 
The net wage rate, w,*, of the representative individual therefore equals 
W,*  = W*[(1 -  S)(l -  t*) + S(1 -  T*)]. 
The individual chooses s so as to maximize her after-tax wage, holding fixed 
the wage costs of the firms, giving as a first-order condition for s 
(3) 
t* -  T*  -  6' 
l+b 
-- - 
(1 -  t*) + s(f* -  T*) 
It is straightforward to show that s is increasing in t* -  T*.  This individual's 
utility equals V*(wz). Denote the individual's labor supply by L*. 
Consider next the optimal policy of a host-country government. The objec- 
tive function of this government is 
where again A*  represents the marginal utility received from extra government 
expenditures. What happened if the government raises T*  and simultaneously 
lowers t* by an amount chosen so as to leave wz  and therefore L* unchanged? 
Note that, given the lack of pure profits, changes in T*  leave firms unaffected 
as well. However, these changes make income shifting less attractive, so s falls, 
causing w* to rise. The resulting change in social welfare equals 
Given that this policy change leads to a drop in income shifting, the term in 
brackets should equal zero, implying that T*  = t*. Again, the optimal tax sys- 
tem consists of a wage tax plus a cash-flow corporate tax at equal rates. 
An alternative to this wage tax, combined with a cash-flow tax on firms to 
prevent income shifting, would have been simply to tax output of firms at some 
rate u*.  Given our assumptions, raising cr*  is equivalent to raising T*  and t* 
simultaneously-both  simply tax labor income and distort only the labor sup- 
ply decision. This is simply the equivalence of a uniform value-added tax and 
a labor income tax. 
3.2  Tax Policy with Cross-Border Income Shifting 
With domestic income shifting alone, we find that countries face an incen- 
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at the same rate. How does this optimal tax structure change if we now take 
into account that each economy is open, that multinationals can set up subsidi- 
aries abroad, and that transfer pricing allows these firms to shift accounting 
income easily between the parent firm and the subsidiary? Many types of situa- 
tions could be examined. We focus on the effects of possible transfer pricing 
between the parent firm and its subsidiaries and ignore other forms of mobility 
across borders. 
To capture these ideas formally, we develop a model with two types of coun- 
tries, home countries and host countries. We allow for multiple countries of 
each type and assume that each is a price-taker in international markets. We 
will examine policies for some representative home country j or representative 
host country i. 
Multinationals are based in countries of typej and use an imported good X 
to produce a good Q. If the representative individual in a country j  allocates 
time  h to producing  Q, we  assume  that  the  resulting  output  equals hf(X) 
-  c(h),  produced using inputs hX, where f(0)  = 0, f’ > 0, and f’ < 0.9  The 
firm takes as given the price for Q in the output market, and this price is the 
numeraire. The input X  can be purchased on the international market at price 
p,  or alternatively the firm can acquire a subsidiary in some country i, produce 
X there, then sell this good to the parent firm for some accounting price p’. We 
assume that the same accounting price, p*, must be used for tax purposes in 
the host country. 
In any country  i,  X  can be produced by either domestic  firms or foreign 
subsidiaries. Labor is the only input used to produce X, and the production 
function is simply X  = L*. For simplicity, we assume that multinationals have 
no technological  advantage in producing X-the  only reason for a multina- 
tional to open up a foreign subsidiary is to take advantage of transfer pricing. 
The going net-of-tax wage rate is w,*.  As described above, the firm can either 
pay workers cash wages or, at a cost, pay them in a form taxed at the corporate 
rate rather than the personal rate. If the fraction s of labor income is paid in a 
form taxed at the corporate rate, then the pretax wage rate faced by the firm 
equals w*[l  + bfs)],  where w*  adjusts so as to leave workers with the going 
net-of-tax wage, w,*. 
Each country is assumed to tax pure profits, with a rate T in countryj and a 
rate T*  in country i.  In addition, we assume that countryj (country i)  imposes 
a surtax on sales revenue at rate u (a*).  Surtax payments are assumed to be 
deductible under the pure profits part of the tax. For example, a firm in country 
i buying inputs on the open market would pay in taxes [~(l  -  a)  + a]f(X) 
-  Tpx.lo.ll 
9. The rest of his time is still spent as an employee earning a wage w taxable at rate t. 
10. We capture the difference in existing corporate taxes from a pure profits tax by  this surtax 
on output. For example, if X represents capital equipment, then this rate difference can capture the 
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For convenience of notation, we let T =  T( 1 -  a)  + u represent the effective 
tax rate on gross sales revenue for operations  in country j,  so that a firm in 
country j pays TAX) -  TPX  in taxes. We define T* analogously. 
Consider the incentive faced by firms in country j to acquire subsidiaries in 
country i.  If a multinational acquires a subsidiary in country i, it must pay taxes 
to the host country on its operations there, and it may also owe some surtax to 
home country j  on the income generated in i.12 Denote the resulting effective 
gross tax rate on subsidiary revenues by T,. Due to the home-country surtax, T 
2  T*,  but because the tax is deferred until the income is repatriated, Tr 5  TI3 
Similarly, denote the effective tax rate on subsidiary wage deductions by  T~, 
where T*  5 T~ 5 T. Given  T, and T,, we define ur implicitly by the relation 
(1 -  T,)  (1 - a,) = (1 -  TJ. In  order to parameterize the degree to which 
surtaxes  are  due  on  foreign-source  income,  we  assume  that  T, = pT  + 
(1 -  p)T* and that T, = PT + (1 -  P)T*  for some p, where 0 5  p 5  1  .I4 
We focus on tax systems that give multinationals an incentive to shift profits 
out of the home country. With a subsidiary that provides an input, profits can 
be shifted by paying a higher price for the input. The increased factor cost in 
the home country is deducted at the rate T,  while the increased revenue for the 
subsidiary is taxed at an effective rate of T,.  Therefore, to make transfer pricing 
attractive, we assume for purposes of discussion that T >  T,. 
If  the firm can set its own factor transfer price by choosing some arbitrary 
accounting price p* for the input X, and if  T  > T,, then we would forecast 
without other additions to the model that all taxable profits would be shifted 
to the subsidiary. That rarely  seems to be the case.I5 To rationalize this, we 
assume that the tax authorities expend resources trying to prevent use of trans- 
fer pricing, and that the threat of being caught and fined limits a firm’s use of 
transfer pricing.I6 
only gradually over time. If  instead X represents materials, then inventory accounting rules can 
also lead to a postponed deduction. 
11. In country j,  the entrepreneur’s star-up costs are also deductible at the corporate tax rate, so 
total corporate taxes are reduced by  ~c(h).  However, this deduction affects only the individual’s 
time allocation, not the firm’s optimal choices of p* and X,  and so we suppress this tax term when 
studying firm behavior. 
12. Many countries, including the United States, tax foreign-source income when it is repatri- 
ated, with a credit given for foreign taxes paid on this income. Firms may or may not have sufficient 
foreign tax credits to eliminate all home-country tax on the subsidiary’s income. 
13. Deferral is a gain only to the extent to which funds kept abroad can be invested there earning 
a higher after-local-tax rate of return than the individual’s after-home-tax discount rate. If there 
were no taxation of capital income and full capital mobility, then T = Tin spite of deferral. 
14. If the firm repatriates profits every year and does not have excess credits, then p = 1; if the 
firm systematically has excess credits, then p = 0. In general, the value of p depends on the length 
of time repatriation is deferred, the gain from deferral given the rate of return abroad relative to 
the discount rate, and the likelihood that the firm has excess credits. It is worth noting that ur, 
which is defined implicitly by (1 -  u,) = (1 -  TJ/(  1 -  TJ,  does nor satisfy u,  = pu + (1 -  p)u*. 
15. U.S.  firms taking advantage of the “possessions tax credit” by manufacturing in F’uerto Rico 
apparently come close to total income shifting; see Grubert and Slemrod (1993). 
16. In an earlier version of this paper we also constructed a model in which the accounting 76  Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
In particular, in order to limit use of transfer pricing, the government is as- 
sumed to expend resources trying to detect use of transfer pricing. Due to these 
enforcement efforts, the government would have some probability 8 of docu- 
menting the use of transfer prices, where 8 should be an increasing function of 
p*.  If the firm is caught using transfer prices, it would need to pay in additional 
taxes an amount ~(p*  -  p)  FX on domestic earnings, where F reflects any fines 
that are imposed (and perhaps any systematic deviation of the corrected price 
from p).  If the corrected price is then used in assessing the tax at repatriation 
on  foreign-source  income,  then  the  firm  also  receives  back  an  amount 
pT(p* -  p)FX on the taxes paid on repatriated foreign earnings if caught using 
transfer pricing,17 implying an expected net penalty of (T -  p7')(p* -  p)FX8. 
We explore the concrete example where 0 = a[@* -  p)/p]@,  with p > 0, and 
for simplicity assume risk neutrality. 
3.2.1 
profits of 
Behavior of Multinationals with Cross-Border Shifting 
For any given h, a multinational chooses X  and p*  to maximize  its net 
Given this objective function, the first-order condition for p* can easily be 
solved to show that 
The optimal value of p* is decreasing in the severity of enforcement, as mea- 
sured here by d's  In addition, p* is increasing in T,  but decreasing in T* and 
T. Increasing T raises the value of deducting a high input cost, p*. Increasing 
T* or T (and thus TJ reduces the value of reporting a high foreign unit revenue, 
p*.  Also, p* >  p  as long as T > T. 
It will prove convenient to note that at this optimal value of p*,  the value of 
F0 equalsly 
price, p*, is used by the parent firm's manager in deciding how much X to purchase, creating an 
inefficiency since the transfer price is artificially high. Such inefficiencies might arise within a 
firm  due to principal agent problems, or due to the high transactions costs of keeping one set of 
books for tax reporting and another set for management operations. (Transfer price accounting is 
at a much finer level of detail and complexity than the separate tax and financial reporting income 
statements and balance sheets that firms in many countries are required to maintain.) The results of 
this model were qualitatively similar to the results we present, so we do not report the details here. 
17. We assume here that the fine is assessed on the net change in overall tax liability, and that 
foreign tax payments are unaffected by these recalculations of domestic tax liabilities. 
18. In general, the direction of effect of p onp* is ambiguous. 
19. Note that the equilibrium probability of being caught is independent of a and a decreasing 
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7-T, 
FO  = 
(P + 1x7 -  PT)' 
If we substitute this expression for FO  into the profit measure, we find that net 
profits equalz0 
Tr" = (1 -  7)flX) -  (1 -  7)pX + __  (7 -  q)(P* -  PIX 
P+l 
-  p(l -  7Ja  -  o*)pX. 
Here, the first two terms measure what profits would have been, had the firm 
simply purchased X on the open market. The third term measures the net gain 
from use of transfer pricing, after taking into account the effects of tax enforce- 
ment-tax  enforcement not only lowers p* but also recaptures the fraction 
1/(1 + P) of the tax savings from transfer pricing. This term in itself raises 
profits. The last term reflects the fact that, without use of transfer pricing, the 
subsidiary operates at a competitive disadvantage because of the surtaxes due 
when profits are repatriated. 
The first-order condition for X can be written, after substituting for the value 
of F0, as 
(5)  P 
P+l 
(1 - 7)y = (1 -  7)p -  -('T  -  q)(p* -  p) 
+ p(1 -  T,)(U -  U*)p. 
Here, the left-hand side equals the value of the extra output whereas the right- 
hand side equals the net-of-tax cost of the extra input. Only the first term on 
the right-hand side appears if the firm does not set up a subsidiary. Since the 
second term on the right-hand side is negative whereas the third term is posi- 
tive, it would appear that the change in X due to the use of transfer pricing is 
ambiguous. However, we show next that X must increase whenever the subsid- 
iary is worth acquiring. 
When is the subsidiary worth acquiring? The answer depends on the extent 
of enforcement in the home country. Comparing profits with and without the 
subsidiary, and  simplifying  using  a  second-order  approximation  to  output 
around the output level without the subsidiary, the change in profits from open- 
ing the subsidiary equals 
(6)  AT,  ==  OS(1 -  7)f'(X, -  X)'  + X, 
-  p(1 -  T,)(U  -  U*)P ,  1 
where Xs is the chosen output level with the subsidiary and X is the chosen 
output level without it. For the subsidiary to be worth opening, the sum of the 
20. In simplifying this expression, we have assumed that competitive firms survive in the host 
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terms inside the brackets must be positive, since the first term is necessarily 
negative. Equation (5) then implies that X, >  X.  Therefore, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the subsidiary to be worth opening is that desired out- 
put  increase  with the subsidiary. As  tax enforcement (measured by  aF)  in- 
creases, the first term inside the brackets becomes smaller, due to the fall in 
p*,  and is eventually dominated by the second term.21  Therefore, subsidiaries 
and transfer pricing would no longer be attractive if there is sufficient tax en- 
forcement. Similarly, as p rises, increasing the importance of the surtax at repa- 
triation, then T, increases and p* falls. Both these changes cause the first term 
inside the brackets to fall. In addition, the rise in p causes the second term to 
become more negative, again making the subsidiary less attractive. 
If X is produced in various countries, each with its own tax structure, where 
will the multinational  prefer to invest? Assume that w*  has been  set so that 
competitive firms break even in all countries where X  is produced,  implying 
that p(  I -  a*)  = w*(  1  + b).  To judge the locational preferences of a multina- 
tional we examine how the firm's aggregate profits, as measured  in equation 
(4), change as we vary the tax rates faced in country i.  The derivative of the 
firm's  profits with respect to T*, taking into account the forecast that wages 
will not vary, equals -(1 -  p)X[(l -  u*)p* -  w*(l + b)].  Since this expres- 
sion equals zero when p*  = p,  it is necessarily  negative given that p* >  p, ' 
yielding the expected conclusion that multinationals prefer to invest in coun- 
tries with lower T*."  Put differently, they would be willing to pay somewhat 
higher wage rates in countries with lower T*, potentially leading to production 
where real resource costs are not minimized. 
Similarly, if  we differentiate  equation (4) with respect to  u*,  taking  into 
account the forecasted change in w*,  we get 
(7) 
The first term on the right-hand  side reflects  the fact that  countries  with a 
higher u*  have lower wage rates, making them more attractive locations, every- 
thing else equal. However, the higher u*  also means higher local tax payments, 
which are only partly offset by the credit received against home-country taxes 
when profits are repatriated. If repatriation of profits can be deferred for a long 
time, so that p = 0, then the second term dominates and the firm would prefer 
to invest in countries with a low value of u*.  But this is not generally true. 
3.2.2  Optimal Tax Policy in the Host Country 
Consider next the optimal tax policy in the host country, now allowing for 
the possible setup of subsidiaries and the resulting use of transfer pricing. The 
objective of the government now equals 
21. In  general,  however, increasing  p has ambiguous effects  on the net gain from transfer 
22. As expected, introducing transfer pricing enables us to rationalize the substantial activity by 
pricing. 
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w* = V(W3 + h*L*(rp*  -  T*W*[1 + b(s)]  + t'W'(1  -  S)  + T*sW*}. 
In analyzing this case, we assume that multinationals own all production facili- 
ties, and that the wage is set so that they are indifferent to locating in this 
country rather than in some other country. If the country is small, then at the 
margin the domestic wage must adjust in response to any given tax change so 
as to  leave net  profits  of  multinationals  unaffected.  (If the  wage falls  far 
enough, domestic ownership will replace foreign ownership.) 
Consider then what happens if the government raises u* while simultane- 
ously lowering  T*  so as to leave profits of multinationals  unaffected  at the 
existing wage rate. Under these simultaneous tax changes, Iy; falls to compen- 
sate for the fall in the rate that applies to tax deductions, leading to a rise in 
p*.  In addition, assume that the government simultaneously raises t* to com- 
pensate for the fall in T* so as to leave w,* and therefore L* unaffected. These 
tax changes cause s to rise, leading to a compensating fall in w* so as to leave 
w*(  1 + b)  unchanged. The resulting change in social welfare must equal zero, 
implying that 
We conclude from equation (8) that sign(T*) = sign(t* -  T*).  Given the need 
for government revenue, the sign of each must be positive, implying that r* 
> 0 and t* >  T*.  Not only is there a positive corporate tax, but in general this 
tax will be distorting-there  is nothing in equation (8) causing T* to equal T*. 
Simply taxing labor income directly leads to efficiency losses due to income 
shifting, whereas the alternative of taxing output creates an efficiency loss by 
making the country a less attractive location for multinationals.  These two 
sources of efficiency loss are traded off under the optimal tax system. 
Note that if domestic income shifting is not a problem, so that s is not re- 
sponsive to tax policy, then the right-hand side of equation (8) equals zero. We 
then infer that  Iy; = 0 under the optimal policy, making the country a very 
attractive location for multinationals, in effect a tax haven. Given the lack of 
domestic income shifting, taxes are simply collected on labor income. If  all 
labor income is paid out as wages, this can be done either through a personal 
tax on labor income, a payroll tax at the firm level, or a refundable value-added 
tax (VAT).23 
If, instead, domestic income shifting is responsive enough to tax policy, so 
that the optimal value of  T* is high, then multinationals would be outbid for 
workers by domestic firms. But with only domestic operations surviving, out- 
put prices would no longer be responsive to tax policy, implying as in the origi- 
23. Note that if the VAT  is not refundable, and adjustment occurs instead through changes in 
the exchange rate, then the tax still distorts the transfer pricing decisions of foreign subsidiaries. 80  Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
nal model that the tax system simply consists of a tax on labor income, taking 
the form either of a personal wage tax supplemented by a cash-flow corporate 
tax at an equal rate, or instead a VAT. 
In general, there are two local optima for tax policy. One has a low T* satis- 
fying equation (8), leading foreign multinationals to set up local subsidiaries. 
The second has a high T*, no activity by multinationals, but no domestic in- 
come shifting. Which local optima dominates would depend on the country's 
circumstances.  In choosing between  the two local  optima, a country would 
make a conscious decision whether to be a tax haven and thereby attract for- 
eign multinationals at the expense of undermining its domestic tax system. 
One other result worth noting is that the host country does not attempt to 
take advantage of the credits offered to multinationals when they repatriate 
profits-as  seen in equation (8), the size of any credit, which is captured by p, 
does not affect the host country's optimal tax policy. This result holds as long 
as p < 1 and stands in contrast to the results in Gordon (1992), derived assum- 
ing p = 1. Even though the net cost of a host-country tax may be small to a 
multinational, competition among host countries drives this tax to zero. 
3.2.3  Optimal Tax Policy in the Home Country 
What can be said about optimal tax policy in the home country, once we 
take into account the ability of multinationals to shift their profits abroad? The 
government's objective function now becomes 
(9)W = Vfw,)  + XL((1 -  h)m -  e(a) -  ~cfh)+h[TffX)  -  7p*X 
Here, e(a)  measures the real costs of monitoring the use of transfer pricing at 
an intensity level a. 
We first consider the optimal revenue surtax, cr. We showed above that with 
no cross-border shifting IT  = 0, and the optimal corporate tax was a nondistor- 
tionary cash-flow tax. That result no longer holds when firms can use transfer 
pricing to shift income across borders. 
In the appendix we show that aW/dX > 0 when tax rates are optimized. To 
use this result, first differentiate W with respect to X  to find that 
+ p(T -  T*)p*X-  p(7 -  T*)w*(~  + b)X + (7 -  pT)(p* -  p)xFe]}. 
(10)  Tf' -  7p* + p(T -  T*)p* -  p(7 -  7*)W* (1 + b) 
+ (7 -  pT)(p* -  p)F0 > 0. 
We can rewrite equation (3,  the first-order condition for X,  as 
(11)  (1 -7-y -(1  -7)p+(7-T*)(p*-p)-p(T-T*)p* 
+ p(7 -  7*)W* -  (7 -  pT)(p* -  p)FB = 0. 
Since we have shown that (1  -7')f'  < (1  -7)p (i.e., X  is greater with a subsid- 
iary than  without), the  sum of  the last four terms of  equation  (11) must be 
positive when opening a subsidiary is profitable. Multiplying equation (1 1) by 
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1 
(12)  Uf' -  T* (p* -  p) -  ---[(T-T*)(p*  -  p) -  p(T -  T*)p* 
1 -7 
+ p(T -  T*)w* -  (7 -  p~(p*  -  p)  ~ep-0. 
We showed in equation (1  1) that the sum of the terms in the brackets is posi- 
tive. Therefore, u > 0 under the optimal policy, which means that a distor- 
tionary corporate tax is used. Taxing entrepreneurs using T is now more costly 
because it induces transfer pricing. As a result, entrepreneurs are taxed instead, 
at least in part, by a distorting tax, u, on gross revenue. This tax also prevents 
an excessive shift into entrepreneurial activity and lessens the firm's use of 
transfer pricing, but at the cost of distorting the firm's internal decisions. 
We now characterize the relationship between the optimal f, T, and T. To do 
so, we make use of another result proved in the appendix: that awlah < 0 
(holding w,  constant) when policies are at their optimal values. Since, by utility 
maximization, &"/ah  = 0, this result implies that, at the optimal policy, tax 
revenue-the  other component of social welfare-falls  at the margin as h in- 
creases. As a result, the labor income tax must exceed the effective tax rate on 
time spent as an entrepreneur, another distortion not present without transfer 
pricing. The opportunity for transfer pricing makes it more difficult to tax en- 
trepreneurial activity. Under optimal policy, there is a tradeoff between cutting 
the distortion favoring entrepreneurial activity and increasing the distortion en- 
couraging transfer pricing. 
To  show this more formally, take the derivative of W with respect to h, hold- 
ing w,  constant, to get 
(13)  Tf -  X[T~*  -  p(T -  T*)p* + p(~  -  T*)w* (l+b) - 
(7 -  p~)(p*  -  p)~e~  -  tw -  Tcf  <o. 
Multiplying equation (lo), awlax, by  X  and subtracting from equation (13) 
yields 
(14)  Tdf- xf')  -  tW -  TC'  < 0. 
Multiply the individual's first-order condition for h by T/( 1  -7) and subtract to 
find that 
Now multiply the firm's first-order condition for X by X  and rearrange to find 
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Since the concavity off(X) ensures that the first term is positive, we learn that 
t >  T under the optimal policy. 
Finally, we can also show that T < t under the optimal policy. To  see this, 
first combine the first-order conditions for X  and for h to get (1 -  T)  (f-Xf’) 
-( 1 -  T)c’=w(  1  -t). Similarly, combine the inequalities characterizing awlah 
and awlax to get T(f-Xf’)-~c’  < tw.  If  we multiply the first equation by  t 
and the second equation by  I -t,  then  substract the first equation from the 
second, we find that 
(t -  T)(f- xf’) >  (t -  T)C’. 
Since 7 < t, we therefore learn in addition that T < t. Since u > 0, we find 
that t > T >  T under the optimal policies. In contrast, without transfer pricing, 
t = T = T under the optimal policies. 
3.2.4  Discussion 
To  some degree U.S. tax policy appears to have  responded to these pres- 
sures. Except for the period 1986-93,  corporate tax rates have been below the 
top personal tax rate, the rate probably most applicable when considering the 
behavior of potential entrepreneurs. In addition, the United States has intro- 
duced some special provisions to lower the incentives to make use of transfer 
pricing. For example, in 1986 the United States introduced new rules for allo- 
cating interest expenses among the various countries in which a multinational 
operates. Previously a firm could shift income by locating its interest expense 
where it was most advantageous. The new rules require U.S.  multinationals to 
allocate a fixed fraction of the parent’s interest expense to foreign-source in- 
come,24  reducing the deductibility of the parent’s interest payments and thereby 
reducing the incentive for intracorporate borro~ing.~~  A similar allocation pro- 
cedure is used for R&D expenses. 
A change in enforcement policy now under discussion is to judge the plausi- 
bility of a multinational’s domestic profits as a whole, rather than the plausibil- 
ity of each of the prices used in calculating profits. This would be done presum- 
ably  by  comparing a ratio  of  the  firm’s  profits  to  sales  or  capital,  to  an 
equivalent ratio for purely domestic firms operating in the same industry. In 
the limit, the firm would  simply be assigned profits for tax purposes equal 
to the profits-to-sales ratio observed for domestic firms times the subsidiary’s 
reported sales. As a result, the tax becomes a tax on sales rather than a tax on 
income, with the rate varying by  industry. Transfer pricing would no longer 
affect a firm’s tax liabilities, except to the degree to which it affected reported 
24. Usually the allocation fraction is equal to the ratio of  foreign to worldwide assets. This 
allocation rule is itself vulnerable to shifting; for example, firms could reduce the allocation by 
leasing foreign assets and buying assets used in domestic operations. 
25. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991) examine the theoretical implications of  the new U.S. 
interest allocation rule for borrowing location, while Froot and Hines (chap. 10, this volume) and 
Collins and Shackelford (1992) provide empirical evidence regarding its impact on firm  behavior. 83  Why Is There Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? 
sales revenue, or reported capital values. In  the notation of  our model, this 
policy has a positive u  but a zero value of  T, a policy not directly consistent 
with the results from the model but arguably not a distant approximation. 
Note that we  have assumed in this model that only inputs are subject to 
transfer pricing, so that a tax tied to sales revenue is not vulnerable to transfer 
pricing. It could equally well be the case, however, that outputs are subject 
to transfer pricing; for example, intermediate goods could be sent abroad for 
assembly. Some of  our specific results certainly change if  we allow for the 
export of  outputs. But the main conclusion should be robust: countries face 
pressure to keep corporate rates low to discourage transfer pricing, at the ex- 
pense of distorting individual career choices.26 
So far, we have taken the value of p as given. What happens as p is changed? 
If p is raised, use of transfer pricing drops. For high enough values of p,  multi- 
nationals will choose not to set up subsidiaries abroad, eliminating any prob- 
lems from transfer pricing. The tax system would then revert to a wage tax 
supplemented by an equal-rate cash-flow corporate tax, given the assumptions 
of  the model. Within the model, there is no efficiency loss from taxing more 
heavily the pure profits earned by  foreign subsidiaries, since transfer pricing 
aside they earn no pure profits, so this would be the optimal policy. 
One way to raise the value of p is to force more rapid repatriation of profits 
from abroad, and in the limit to tax foreign-source income at accrual. Such a 
policy may be costly to enforce. Another way would be to decrease the tax on 
domestic-source capital income, thereby reducing the gain from having funds 
accumulate abroad free of this domestic tax. In the limit, if there were no do- 
mestic tax on capital income, there would be no gain from the deferral until 
repatriation of the tax due on foreign-source income.27  We  can also solve for 
the optimal values of a versus E Here, the result is immediate and clear. Hold- 
ing aF fixed, and thereby holding p*  fixed, the government would want to 
lower a in order to save on resource costs, and increase fines to compensate. 
Fines can equally well discourage transfer pricing, but involve a redistribution 
from the firm to the government rather than a loss of real resources. This is 
simply a replication of the results in Becker (1968). 
Imposing large fines on those caught using transfer pricing results in firms 
facing sizable risks, however, since it is uncertain whether use of transfer prices 
will be detected by the government. Polinsky and Shave11 (1979) have argued 
against such aggressive use of fines because of the risk-bearing costs this pol- 
icy imposes. But idiosyncratic risk faced by publicly traded firms should im- 
pose little or no risk-bearing costs on diversified shareholders. Large fines can 
well lead to heavy litigation costs, however, and these litigation costs must be 
traded off with the real costs of greater enforcement efforts. Another problem 
26. The policy proposal to base taxes on sales is obviously very vulnerable to transfer pricing 
27. This is equivalent to arguing that the current tax treatment of pensions would not affect the 
on exported outputs. 
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with high fines is that the government’s assessment of the market price may be 
systematically in error, so that the high potential fines force the firm to make 
use of distorted prices for tax purposes, thereby  distorting its real decisions. 
Since the government may be in a poor position to guess the appropriate market 
price for each of the thousands of specific items transferred within a firm,  large 
fines could well lead to substantial distortions to internal allocation decisions 
within firms. 
Rather than the government expending resources on enforcement, it could 
instead require firms to expend resources, for example, to document more care- 
fully the criteria used in setting their transfer prices, to aid the government in 
its enforcement  efforts. Simply shifting resource costs to the firm, however, 
does not eliminate the loss of  real resources.** Note in addition that this ap- 
proach may be more effective at raising p than at raising a, yet increases in p 
have ambiguous effects on the firm’s net gain from using transfer pricing. 
3.3  Other Tax Implications of Income Shifting 
The above model helps explain the existence of at least cash-flow corporate 
taxes in small open economies and justifies some deviations from a cash-flow 
tax in order to lessen the amount of transfer pricing that occurs. The mere 
existence of corporate income taxes is not the only puzzle raised in the recent 
theoretical analyses of optimal tax policy in an open economy, however. Many 
detailed aspects of existing taxes have also seemed puzzling. In particular, the 
past literature argues that residence-based taxes on the return to savings can be 
appropriate for a small open economy, but that source-based taxers would not 
be. Yet existing corporate taxes deviate in a variety of ways from a residence- 
based tax. To begin with, existing taxes apply equally to all firms operating in 
a country, whereas a residence-based tax would not tax the return earned by 
foreign-owned firms operating in the country-doing  so prevents the country 
from taking full advantage of the gains from trade in the world capital market. 
Second, when domestic-owned subsidiaries operating abroad face local taxes, 
a number of authors (e.g., Hamada 1966) have argued that these taxes should 
be treated as a deductible expense, rather than credited against domestic taxes 
as under U.S.  law. The idea is that a tax system should be designed so that the 
return to the country on domestic versus foreign investments is equated, and 
the return to the country on foreign investments would be measured net of any 
taxes paid  abroad. Third, under a pure residence-based  tax domestic-owned 
subsidiaries operating abroad would be taxed on their income at accrual (so 
that income from domestic and foreign sources is taxed at the same rate), rather 
than at repatriation as under existing taxes. 
28. It is certainly possible that resources expended by firms gathering internal information may 
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Each of these aspects of existing corporate taxes seems puzzling if the cor- 
porate tax were in fact being designed to tax the return to savings by domestic 
residents. As argued above, however, another important use of a corporate tax 
is as a backstop to the tax on the labor income of domestic residents. If this is 
the sole role for the corporate tax, that is, if there is no attempt to tax the return 
to savings by domestic residents, then the above features of the corporate tax 
can be rationalized easily. 
Consider the first puzzle: Why do countries impose a source-based tax on 
foreign firms at the same rate as the residence-based tax on domestic firms? 
We  will treat the case of a host country. We  showed above that host countries 
would have an incentive to impose at least some taxes on foreign subsidiaries 
located in the country if  domestic income shifting is a problem. However, in 
that model domestic firms are not competitive with multinationals, so all own- 
ership is foreign and we cannot determine the optimal tax rules for domestic 
firms. If  we alter our assumptions to allow some domestic firms to survive in 
equilibrium (perhaps in a different industry), what would be the appropriate 
policy? If  these firms were not multinationals, they would not be able to shift 
income across borders. Then by our arguments in section 3.1, the optimal pol- 
icy would be a cash-flow tax at rate t*, so as to avoid domestic income shifting. 
This suggests that domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms would face differ- 
ent tax  rates, and only employees of  foreign-owned firms would engage in 
domestic income shifting. But if  tax rates differed by  ownership, then a new 
form of  income shifting becomes possible: domestic owners can give away 
their firms to foreign owners, who receive nothing in return since the firms 
continue to break even. However, the domestic employees of these firms gain 
because they can now  shift part of  their labor income into corporate form, 
making it subject to the lower corporate tax rate faced by foreign-owned firms. 
If this nominal transfer of ownership to foreigners is easy enough, then no rate 
differential between domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms can survive. A 
similar argument would also achieve this result for foreign and domestic firms 
that both operate in a home country. 
Next consider the second puzzle: Why do countries give credits for foreign 
taxes paid? To  begin with, we have  already shown that a government would 
want to tax income earned abroad, and that the tax on foreign-source income 
should be designed to limit the incentives for cross-border income shifting. In 
the model above, this is most directly accomplished by setting p = 1, so that 
foreign income is taxed at the same rate as domestic income. In fact, interna- 
tional income shifting can take a variety of forms in addition to transfer pric- 
ing, increasing the pressure to keep p high. For example, if  the tax rate on 
foreign earnings is less than the domestic tax rate on labor income, then do- 
mestic entrepreneurs have the incentive to set up subsidiaries abroad that make 
use of  their ideas, rather than at home. (In this case, the subsidiary embodies 
the ideas of the home-country entrepreneur; in the previous case, it embodied 
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3.1, the optimal tax treatment would again involve taxing this foreign source 
income at the same rate as domestic-source income. 
Together these pressures would lead us to expect a subsidiary to be taxed at 
the maximum of  the corporate tax rates prevailing in the host and the home 
countries, to prevent tax avoidance by either domestic or foreign residents. This 
is precisely what happens under existing crediting schemes (assuming deferral 
has no effect on the net tax rate). Does crediting introduce other distortions 
due to the differential tax treatment of foreign and domestic firms operating in 
the same country? Suppose a domestic entrepreneur considers selling his firm 
to foreigners. If he keeps the firm himself, he faces the domestic tax rate, but 
if  he sells it to foreigners the firm would face the maximum of the domestic 
and the foreign rates, which would seem to discourage such a sale even though 
there might be good economic grounds for it. The foreign firm can avoid this 
surtax, however, simply by  making royalty or wage payments to the original 
entrepreneur equal to the profits earned from his ideas. The return to the entre- 
preneur’s ideas would still be taxed at the labor income tax rate. Net of these 
royalty/wage payments, the firm would break even, so that any cash-flow surtax 
on the firm would collect no revenue and would be nondist~rting.~~  Therefore, 
existing crediting schemes can readily be rati~nalized.~~ 
The third puzzle we discuss is: Why do countries tax foreign-source income 
upon repatriation rather than when it accrues? In fact, the deferral of  tax on 
foreign-source income creates no problems as long as the after-local-tax rate 
of  return earned abroad equals the firm’s discount rate.31  If  the return earned 
abroad were lower, then the domestic owner could simply repatriate earnings 
as they accrue. Deferral is only a problem if the rate of return earned on funds 
kept abroad exceeds that available at home. If  the domestic government does 
not tax the return to savings, then capital mobility implies this cannot occur. 
Deferral remains a puzzle, however, to the extent that there is a domestic tax on 
the return to savings, unless the costs of enforcing a tax at accrual are too high. 
While we have provided a rationale for a variety of aspects of existing corpo- 
rate income taxes, some other puzzles remain. For one, we have not addressed 
the question raised in the prior literature concerning why existing corporate 
taxes include the return to capital in the tax base.3z  In addition, while we have 
29. If the foreign corporate tax is distorting, then the sale can increase tax payments. However, 
if the foreign tax applies uniformly to firms owned by foreign residents, regardless of where these 
firms are located, then it simply reduces the return to labor in the foreign countries rather than 
affecting the attractiveness of acquiring such a firm, leaving the above results unchanged. 
30. This theory rationalizes the use of credits, but does not preclude the use of deductions. If 
taxes paid abroad were allowed as a deduction rather than credited against domestic tax liabilities, 
as recommended in Hamada (1966), the tax rate on foreign-source income would be yet higher. It 
would certainly be high enough to prevent income shifting, yet without income shifting it would 
still apply to a zero tax base and so impose no distortions. 
31. Seen. 13, above. 
32. While the above model could rationalize limiting the deductions for capital purchases if 
physical capital inputs were particularly subject to transfer pricing, this explanation does not seem 
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argued that countries have  an incentive to tax foreign-source income at the 
same effective rate as domestic-source income, some countries (e.g., France 
and the Netherlands) exempt foreign-source income from tax. This also seems 
puzzling, unless their domestic tax rates are low enough that residents would 
not gain by  shifting income abroad. An intermediate position is taken by Nor- 
way, which exempts foreign-source income earned in countries with tax rates 
at least two-thirds as high as Norway’s rate, while taxing income from low- 
tax countries. 
Several further complications could be added to the model, changing the 
results. For example, given the setup of  the model, the optimal tax  scheme 
ignoring transfer pricing would impose equal tax rates on employees and entre- 
preneurs, in order to avoid distorting career choices. But a major activity of 
entrepreneurs is to develop new  ideas for profitable business activities. The 
return earned by  entrepreneurs on these new ideas can differ from the social 
return to the ideas for a variety of reasons, justifying a differential tax treatment 
to correct for these distorted incentives. For example, others can learn an entre- 
preneur’s ideas from observation and set up competing firms using the same 
ideas, diluting the profits of the original entreprene~r.~~  In addition, the original 
entrepreneur can use his new information to profit from trading on the securi- 
ties market. As argued by Hirshleifer (1971), the resulting profits from trade 
can well exceed the social return to the idea. If  returns to the entrepreneur’s 
ideas result from acquired monopoly rents, for example, from successful rent- 
seeking behavior, then the social return to the effort will again be less than 
the private return. Therefore, a variety of  questions can be raised about the 
appropriate relative tax rates on employees versus entrepreneurs. 
One response to transfer pricing by U.S. states is to shift from separate ac- 
counting to formula apportionment. Under separate accounting, transfer prices 
are needed for all goods and services traded across state lines, raising severe 
enforcement problems. In  contrast, under formula apportionment, national 
rather than state profits are calculated. These national profits are then appor- 
tioned among the various states based on the fraction of  the firm’s capital, 
payroll, and sales located in each state. This approach effectively eliminates 
pressures from transfer pricing among domestic operations of firms, at least as 
long as the factors in the formula are not themselves subject to transfer pricing. 
Would this approach also make sense for taxation at a world level? Not if 
income shifting is the primary consideration justifying the presence of a corpo- 
rate income tax. To prevent income shifting, a country would want an entrepre- 
neur to face the same tax rate on his corporate income as he would have faced 
instead on his personal income. But under formula apportionment, the effec- 
tive tax rate faced by  an entrepreneur would be a weighted average of the tax 
rates prevailing in all the jurisdictions in which he does business. The entrepre- 
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neur therefore has the incentive to invest in low-tax jurisdictions, thereby rai- 
sing the return to being an entrepreneur. 
3.4  Conclusions 
Several papers, such as Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991), show 
that standard theoretical models forecast that a small open economy will not 
impose source-based taxes on capital income. Unless residence-based capital 
income taxes can include foreign-source as well as domestic-source income, 
which in practice is unlikely given the difficulties a government faces in moni- 
toring foreign-source income, then  as argued by  Razin  and  Sadka (1991) 
residence-based taxes would not be feasible. Optimal taxes simply consist of 
taxes on immobile domestic factors, presumably labor and land. But this theo- 
retical forecast stands in stark contrast to the observed tax law in essentially 
all developed countries, where corporate taxes not only exist but are roughly 
comparable to the top personal tax rates. 
In this paper, we argue that many aspects of the existing corporate tax law 
would seem quite sensible if the primary role of the corporate tax is to discour- 
age income shifting between the personal and the corporate tax bases, or be- 
tween  domestic  and  foreign  subsidiaries. Unless  corporate  tax  rates  are 
roughly comparable to personal tax rates, business owners would be able to 
avoid taxes by retaining earnings within their firm, and later selling shares in 
the firm,  so that the earnings are taxed at capital gains rates rather than at 
personal rates. Unless foreign-owned firms operating in the country are subject 
to domestic taxes at the same rate, a domestic business owner would be able 
to avoid taxes on the returns to his ideas by selling his firm  to foreign owners. 
Similarly, a country would need to tax the income of domestic-owned subsidi- 
aries operating abroad to prevent entrepreneurs from facing a tax incentive to 
make use of their ideas abroad rather than in the home country. 
If  the tax rate on domestic-owned subsidiaries abroad were less than the 
domestic corporate tax rate, then an additional distortion would be created be- 
cause multinationals can avoid domestic taxes by  shifting their profits abroad 
through transfer prices even if the firms embodying their profitable ideas re- 
main  at  home.  While  taxing  foreign-source income  at  the  same  rate  as 
domestic-source income eliminates this pressure, a second-best response is to 
lower the domestic tax on elements of the income statement that are most sub- 
ject to transfer pricing. For example, the United States has reduced the effec- 
tive  tax  rate  applying to  interest  deductions of  multinationals through  its 
9482 rules. 
Viewing the corporate tax as primarily a backstop to the personal tax on 
labor income, rather than as primarily a tax on capital income, requires an 
important change in focus from that of  the recent academic literature. Given 
the ease with which existing tax policy can be rationalized based on this role 
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the pressures from income shifting between the personal and the corporate tax 
bases? We  have  presented  some evidence in  Gordon  and  MacKie-Mason 
(1994) and MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991) on the degree to which firms 
change between corporate and noncorporate status in response to tax incen- 
tives. There has been virtually no attempt to date in the tax literature, however, 
to measure the degree to which individuals shift their form of pay in response 
to tax differences. Since our model suggests that this form of income shifting 
appears to be a major consideration in the design of  existing tax structures, 
measuring the degree to which such income shifting occurs in response to tax 
differences is an important topic for future research. 
Appendix 
Proof That awlah < 0 When w,  Is Held Constant 
In the model with both domestic and cross-border income shifting, consider 
the effects in the home country of raising T and in addition raising T by enough 
to keep firms’ choices for X unchanged, given p*.  Assume in addition that t is 
simultaneously cut by enough so as to keep w,  ~nchanged.~~  Under the optimal 
tax policy, the resulting marginal change in welfare should be zero. The re- 
sulting change in welfare equals 
aW  ah  ah aT  ah at  (Al)  ~  -+--  +--+--+-- 
aP  aw  * (  :T*  $;;:)  ah(&  dTaT  at 
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the combined increases in T  and T 
cause p* to rise, and that this rise in p* lowers welfare. Therefore, the second 
term in equation (Al) must be positive. But the increase in business taxes and 
the drop in labor taxes will cause h to fall, implying that awlah must be nega- 
tive, when evaluated at the optimal policies. 
Proof That awlax > 0 When w,  Is Held Constant 
In the model with both domestic and cross-border income shifting, consider 
the effects of raising u, while cutting t so as to leave w,  unchanged. The first- 
order condition is 
This tax policy raises corporate taxes and cuts personal taxes. As a result, h 
will fall, implying that the first term in equation (A2) is positive. In addition, 
raising the surtax on repatriated profits by  raising u makes transfer pricing 
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relatively less attractive. Thus p*  decreases, implying that the second term is 
also positive. Therefore, the third term must be negative. But the increase in 
the surtax on revenues leads to a reduction in X,  implying that dWdX > 0 
under the optimal policies. 
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Comment  T. Scott Newlon 
With this paper, Roger Gordon and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason have made an inter- 
esting and useful contribution to the body of work on tax policy in open econo- 
mies. The paper takes the first steps in introducing income-shifting possibilit- 
ies, both domestic and cross border, into a model with international investment 
to analyze the effects of such possibilities on individual and firm behavior and 
on optimal tax policies. 
The authors start by posing the question of why there should be a corporate 
income tax in a small open economy. To the extent that the corporate income 
tax is a source-based tax on capital income, it would, at first blush, make no 
sense for a country in this situation to impose such a tax. Where a country is a 
price-taker in the global capital market, the tax would be shifted entirely onto 
immobile factors of  production such as land and labor. Hence, it would be 
more efficient simply to tax the immobile factors directly. And yet most coun- 
tries do impose corporate income taxes, and generally at substantial rates. 
The authors turn to a justification for this behavior that, as they recognize, 
is not new. The corporate income tax may act as a backstop for the personal 
income tax. In particular, in the absence of a tax on corporate income, individu- 
als may have an incentive to shift income into the corporate sector. This shifting 
may  occur, for example, through career choices, distortions to the organiza- 
tional form of  economic activity, tax-sheltering activities, and so forth. The 
authors then go on to examine some of the effects under these conditions of 
the potential for cross-border income shifting, between parent firms and their 
foreign subsidiaries, on firm behavior and optimal tax policy. 
To carry out the analysis, a relatively simple model is formulated that allows 
T.  Scott Newlon  is an economist in the Office of Tax  Analysis of  the U.S. Department of  the 
The views expressed in this Comment are those of  the author and do not necessarily represent 
Treasury. 
the views of  the U.S. Treasury Department. 92  Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
some specific kinds of domestic income shifting, either career choice or purely 
unproductive  tax-sheltering  activities,  and  cross-border  income  shifting by 
multinational corporations through their transfer prices. In this model the only 
reason  for  cross-border  investment  is  to  take  advantage  of  cross-border 
income-shifting possibilities. 
The problem is approached in two stages. In the first stage, only domestic 
income shifting is permitted. The results here are not surprising. The optimal 
tax policy is to set uniform tax rates on wage and corporate income. This policy 
does  not  distort  individuals’  career choices and  makes  unproductive  tax- 
sheltering activities unattractive. 
Although these results are unsurprising,  it was a clever idea to introduce 
domestic income shifting into this model. It provides a good reason for having 
a corporate income tax in the first place and thus allows the authors to model 
various policy tradeoffs when cross-border income shifting is introduced into 
the analysis. Moreover, domestic income shifting is an empirically important 
phenomenon. For example, the desire to limit this sort of income-shifting ac- 
tivity was one of  the reasons for bringing the top personal and corporate tax 
rates closer together under the Tax Reform Act of  1986.  And concerns regard- 
ing increased incentives for such income shifting were raised with respect to 
the increases in top personal tax rates enacted in 1993. So perhaps it should 
not be a puzzle that corporate income is taxed at all; the real puzzle may instead 
by why it is taxed so heavily in many countries. 
In the second stage of the analysis, the possibility of international investment 
and cross-border income shifting are introduced. In the model, the only type 
of international investment is acquisition of firms in countries that produce the 
production input (host countries) by the firms in countries that use that input 
(home countries). Since there is nothing special about the home-country firms 
in this  model, the  only reason for them to become multinational  is to take 
advantage of  income-shifting  opportunities.  The tax  rate  is  assumed  to be 
lower in the host countries than in the home countries to provide an incentive 
for income shifting. Where home-country firms do acquire a host-country sub- 
sidiary, the total  tax rate  on the  subsidiary’s profit  is lower than  the  home- 
country tax rate but higher than the host-country tax rate, thereby implicitly 
assuming that the home country taxes its firms on a residence basis with de- 
ferral for foreign income. 
The authors have chosen to model the cost to a firm of cross-border income 
shifting  as  the possibility  that  it will be caught and fined. Another type  of 
income-shifting cost could result from distortions to management  incentives 
caused by setting transfer prices that are different from market prices; however, 
this seems likely to be much less important in determining the level of income 
shifting than the expected costs associated with tax enforcement. Firms have 
many different ways to decouple managers’  incentives  from the accounting 
transfer prices they face. Furthermore,  survey evidence presented  in Wilson 93  Why Is There Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? 
(1993) suggests that firms that use transfer prices aggressively do not consider 
distortions to productive efficiency to be a serious problem. 
Under these assumptions, the paper derives a series of results for optimal 
tax policy in the host and home countries. For both host and home countries 
the optimal tax policy should include a positive tax on corporate income, but 
at a lower rate than the tax on labor income. This trades off losses from domes- 
tic income shifting against losses, in the case of host countries, from making 
the country a less attractive location for multinational investment, and, in the 
case of  home countries, from cross-border income shifting. The greater the 
scope for cross-border income shifting, the lower should be the corporate tax 
rate relative to the wage tax. Thus, even though domestic income shifting pro- 
vides a justification for having a corporate income tax in an open economy, 
cross-border income shifting provides another reason for keeping the rate of 
that tax relatively low. 
One of the important results is a confirmation of something already known 
by tax-policy-makers: by eliminating deferral the home country eliminates the 
incentive for cross-border income shifting by  its multinational corporations. 
One of the reasons for the various antideferral measures contained in the U.S. 
tax code is that they serve to relieve pressure on the transfer-pricing rules. Of 
course, this only works in the case of  a country’s own corporations and not 
where income may be shifted out of the country by  corporations resident in 
other countries. Given that the focus in policy circles in the United States is 
currently largely on transfer-pricing issues associated with foreign-controlled 
companies, eliminating deferral is not likely to be  viewed as the answer to 
transfer-pricing abuses. 
The results also imply that transfer-pricing enforcement should rely heavily 
on penalties for noncomplicance and only lightly on monitoring of taxpayers. 
This is a well-known result for models such as this, since fines have no re- 
source cost while monitoring does. To  some extent tax policy in the United 
States has followed the first part of this policy prescription, if not the second. 
Congress passed a stiff set of transfer-pricing penalties in 1990 and then tough- 
ened those penalties even more in 1993. 
Given the simplicity of the model, however, compliance and enforcement 
issues cannot be given their full due. There is general agreement among tax 
practitioners that tough penalties are not likely to be enough. Firms are likely 
to pay  little heed to the most severe penalties that are likely to be imposed 
if  the tax authorities are unable to catch transfer-pricing abuses or make tax 
adjustments stick in the courts. The IRS has had a poor record in prosecuting 
transfer-pricing cases. 
What is missing from the analysis, and could be a topic for fruitful future 
research, are the informational aspects of transfer-pricing enforcement. One of 
the most important aspects of transfer-pricing enforcement may be the infor- 
mational asymmetry between taxpayers and the government. Firms generally 94  Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
start with a much better knowledge of their business and the markets they oper- 
ate in than the tax authorities have. The tax authorities must often incur heavy 
initial costs to acquire information that taxpayers already possess. Taking into 
account this informational asymmetry, the optimal enforcement policy is likely 
to include mechanisms that induce taxpayers to reveal information about them- 
selves and their transfer-pricing practices. U.S. transfer-pricing policy has re- 
cently been headed down exactly this track. Recently imposed rules link the 
avoidance of large transfer-pricing  penalties in the event of an assessment to 
the taxpayer having set its transfer prices reasonably  in the first place, docu- 
mented how the transfer prices were arrived at, and provided IRS examiners 
with their documentation on request. 
In summary, this paper represents an important contribution to the analysis 
of optimal tax policies in open economics. By integrating domestic and cross- 
border income shifting into the same model, useful insights are gained about 
the effects of both on tax policy. 
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